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Bankruptcy Reform 
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore 
Following the rapid demise of  socialism, East European countries have been 
grappling with the question of what kind of market economy is best suited to 
their future needs.’ Should they incorporate capitalism wholesale, and, if so, 
which kind: American, European, Japanese, or some new version? How should 
problems of the transition be handled? What kinds of  institutional structures 
and laws are most appropriate for their situation? 
This paper is concerned with an aspect of this last question: the choice of 
bankruptcy law. The decision facing East European countries on this question 
is both important and far from straightforward. It is generally recognized by 
economists and lawyers in the West that bankruptcy law has an important role 
to play in ensuring a timely resolution of the problems of insolvent or finan- 
cially distressed firms and a socially efficient disposition of such firms’ assets. 
Yet both practitioners and academics are dissatisfied with current Western pro- 
cedures, which are thought either to cause the liquidation of healthy firms (as 
in  Chapter 7 of  the U.S.  Bankruptcy  Code) or to be  inefficient  and biased 
toward reorganization under incumbent management (as in Chapter I1 in the 
United States). Nor is there any consensus about how to improve these proce- 
dures. Thus, it is far from obvious that East European countries should simply 
pick “the best available Western procedure” (whatever that may be). 
In  this  paper,  we  describe  a  new  bankruptcy  procedure  that  we  believe 
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I. Throughout the paper, Eastern Europe is used as shorthand for Eastern Europe and the for- 
mer Soviet Union. 
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avoids some of the main pitfalls of existing procedures. While the stimulus for 
this proposal comes from the current situation of East European countries, we 
should emphasize that the proposal is potentially just as relevant for Western 
countries that are trying to improve existing procedures. We should also point 
out that our procedure is designed to be effective in the new post-transition- 
to-capitalism  Eastern Europe, rather than  being concerned  directly with the 
transition process itself. 
Our procedure  is a simple one. First, when a firm goes bankrupt,  all the 
firm’s existing  debts are canceled, and an individual-a  judge, say-is  ap- 
pointed to supervise the procedure. This individual has two immediate tasks: 
task A is to solicit cash and noncash bids for all or part of the “new”  firm 
(which at this juncture is all equity); task B is to allocate rights to the equity 
in this new  firm among the former claimholders.  These two tasks could be 
carried out in parallel and completed within a prespecified period of time: for 
example, three to four months. After this, the new shareholders-that  is, the 
former claimholders who now hold shares-vote  on which bid to select. The 
successful bid may be a cash bid (which corresponds to a liquidation or a sale 
of the firm) or a noncash bid. Noncash bids allow for reorganization  and/or 
recapitalization of the firm as a going concern. For example, the old managers 
might propose that they keep their jobs and that each current shareholder re- 
ceive a share in the postbankruptcy  firm. Or the same financial arrangement 
might be offered by a new management team. A third possibility is that man- 
agement (old or new) might induce some leverage in the postbankruptcy firm 
by proposing to borrow from the capital market and to offer each current share- 
holder a combination of cash and equity in the (leveraged) firm. After the vote, 
the firm exits from bankruptcy. 
In essence, our proposed scheme is a decentralized variant on Chapter 7, in 
which noncash (as well as cash) bids are allowed and ownership of the firm is 
homogenized (to all equity) so that the owners can decide (by vote) which of 
the bids to accept.2 However, insofar as noncash bids allow for reorganization/ 
recapitalization, our proposal can also be viewed as a decentralized version of 
Chapter 11, in which conflicts of interest among different claimant groups are 
avoided through the homogenization of ownership. 
We think that our procedure  strikes the right balance between  liquidation 
and reorganization.  Unlike Chapter 7, the procedure  gives claimholders  the 
option of maintaining the firm as a going concern if the company’s bad fortunes 
are the result of bad luck rather than bad management. Unlike Chapter 1 1, the 
procedure creates a (roughly) level playing field in which incumbent manage- 
ment is not advantaged in the reorganization process. 
The paper is organized as follows. In  section  15.1, we examine the need 
2. What is less essential to our scheme is the precise mechanism by  which rights to equity in 
the firm  are allocated (task B). The main version  of  our procedure uses an  allocation scheme 
developed by Lucian Bebchuk (1988). In sec. 15.5, however, we present some alternative mecha- 
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for a statutory bankruptcy procedure. In section 15.2, we discuss a number of 
procedures that either are used in practice worldwide or have been proposed 
in the literature. In section 15.3, we lay out our new procedure. We assess our 
scheme in section 15.4. In section 15.5, we present some alternative mecha- 
nisms  that might be  used  for allocating equity. In  section  15.6, we discuss 
certain key ancillary issues, such as claims disputes, the treatment of secured 
creditors, and the need for debtor-in-possession financing. Finally, in section 
15.7, we raise some questions concerning the feasibility of our scheme in the 
current environment of Eastern Europe. In an appendix, we briefly survey what 
is happening now in two of  the countries of Eastern Europe-Hungary  and 
Poland. 
15.1  The Role of Bankruptcy Procedure 
It is generally accepted by lawyers and economists that the state has an im- 
portant role in enforcing private contracts. The point is that, while ex ante two 
parties may find a contractual arrangement mutually beneficial, ex post one of 
them may have an incentive to breach. Thus, it is in the interests of both parties 
that a third party-the  state-have  the power to enforce contractual perfor- 
mance or to compel the breaching party to compensate the victim by paying 
money damages. 
A debt contract is a particular kind of contract where one party, the debtor 
D, borrows money from another party, the creditor C, and in return promises 
C a (typically  larger) payment in the future. If  D defaults (i.e., breaches), C 
has two main remedies at his disposal (outside bankruptcy). First, in the case 
of a secured loan, C can seize the assets that serve as collateral for the loan. 
Second, in the case of an unsecured loan, C can sue D and can call on the clerk 
of the court (or the sheriff) to enforce the court’s judgment, possibly by selling 
the debtor’s assets (see Baird and Jackson 1985,2). 
This method of  debt collection seems fairly uncontroversial  when there is 
only a small number of  creditors or when the debtor has sufficient assets to 
cover his liabilities.’ However, problems arise if there are many creditors and 
the debtor’s assets are less than his liabilities (i.e., he is insolvent). Under these 
conditions, as Jackson  (1986) among others has emphasized,  creditors will 
waste resources trying to be first to seize their collateral or to obtain a judgment 
against the debtor. Also, this race by creditors to be first may lead to the dis- 
mantling of the firm’s assets and to a loss of value for all creditors if the firm 
is worth more as a whole than as a collection of pieces. 
Given this, it is in the collective interest of creditors-and  society too-that 
3. An exception should be mentioned. This is where the debtor is an individual whose wealth 
would be reduced to close to zero if creditors could seize his assets. Part of (personal) bankruptcy 
law is concerned with providing such individuals with protection from their creditors. In this paper, 
we are interested in the debts of firms, not individuals, and so will not deal with this issue directly. 218  Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore 
the disposition of the debtor’s assets be carried out in an orderly manner, via a 
centralized bankruptcy procedure. 
Of course, in an ideal world, there would be no need for the state to set up 
its own bankruptcy procedure: individuals could do it by themselves. That is, 
a debtor who borrows from a creditor could specify as part of the debt contract 
how his assets will be divided among various creditors (and the debtor himself) 
in the event of a default or insolvency. Writing such a contract is likely to be 
very difficult and costly, however, particularly  since the debtor may acquire 
different types of assets and new creditors as time passes, and it may be very 
hard to specify how the division process should change as a function of such 
developments. Moreover, in practice, contracts like this are not ~ritten.~  Thus, 
it seems likely that many parties will choose to take advantage of the bank- 
ruptcy mechanism provided by the state; moreover, even if, by some chance, a 
substantial number of parties choose to make their own arrangements, society 
must still deal with those parties who make no arrangements at all.5 
15.2  Existing Bankruptcy Procedures 
We turn now to bankruptcy  procedures  that either are used in practice or 
have been proposed in the literature. It is useful to classify them under four 
broad headings: (1) auctions, (2) structured bargaining, (3) administration, and 
(4) automatic financial restructuring. 
15.2.1  Auctions 
If the only problem with a standard debt collection scheme were that it led 
to inefficient “grab” behavior by creditors, then the obvious solution would be 
for a trustee or receiver to supervise the sale of the firm’s assets and distribute 
the proceeds according to the priority of creditors’ claims. This is essentially 
a description of Chapter 7 in the United States and of U.K. bankruptcy  law 
prior to the 1986 Insolvency Act.6 
A widespread concern with a Chapter 7-type  proceeding, however, is that 
viable companies will be sold off at a substantial discount in a piecemeal liqui- 
dation. Some law and economics scholars (e.g., Baird 1986) have argued that 
this concern is misplaced because there is nothing to stop someone bidding for 
the company as a going concern: if the whole is really worth more than the 
4. This may be because current laws do not allow parties to opt out of the state’s bankruptcy pro- 
cedure. 
5.  Of course, it does not follow from this that the costs of providing a bankruptcy mechanism 
for firms in financial distress should be paid for out of general taxation; arguably, firms that want 
to take advantage of such a mechanism should be forced to pay a fee (presumably before they get 
into financial distress!). 
6.  The German bankruptcy code also has the flavor of Chapter 7 in that it favors liquidation over 
reorganization. A dchtor firm can avoid liquidation only if at least 35 percent of its creditors can 
be repaid in  cash and the reorganization plan is approved by  three-fourths (in value terms) of the 
unsecured creditors (see Mitchell 1990). 219  The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform 
parts, then a bid for the whole will dominate a set of independent bids for the 
parts. These scholars have gone on to argue that, because of this, Chapter 7 is 
indeed the best bankruptcy procedure:  it is simple, it avoids protracted bar- 
gaining and litigation, and it leads to an efficient out~ome.~ 
While the argument of these scholars has some merit, the conclusion that a 
competitive  auction  will  inevitably  lead  a  firm  to  be  sold  to  the  highest- 
willingness-to-pay  bidder at its (maximized) value is extreme. Auctions work 
well if raising cash for bids is easy and there is plenty of competition among 
bidders. However, even in the most advanced Western economies, these condi- 
tions often will  not be  met, and they are even less likely to be satisfied in 
Eastern Europe.X 
Consider first what we shall call theJinancing problem. Imagine that a huge 
company like IBM were put on the block. (In Eastern Europe, where markets 
are less  well developed,  similar problems  could  arise with  a much  smaller 
company.) Say that the expected present value of IBM’s earnings is $100 bil- 
lion. Would any bidder be prepared to offer this much for the company? The 
answer to this question might well be no. One way  to raise $100 billion is to 
approach a large number of small investors through what is in effect a public 
offering, but this is likely to be difficult given the time scale of an auction like 
Chapter 7.  A  more  practical  way  is to raise  the  money  from a few large 
institutions/investors (possibly with a view to going public later). The problem 
with this strategy is that (at least in the short run) these investors will be bearing 
substantial risk and so will be prepared to buy IBM only at a discount.’ 
We should emphasize that the financing problem that we are identifying here 
is not to do with management having private information about the firm’s value 
(and being unable to verify it to the market). Rather, it is to do with the transac- 
tions costs associated with assembling a suitable group of investors to be risk 
bearers for the new firm. But notice that there is a natural group of risk bearers 
7. Some scholars would push the argument for Chapter 7 still further. The piecemeal liquidation 
value of a firm may sometimes exceed its going-concern value. This could happen if the firm is 
inefficiently large but managers have been unwilling to split it up. possibly because they enjoy the 
perquisites of power. A Chapter 7 auction is then  a good way  of  realizing value for creditors 
and shareholders. 
8. One might ask why it matters how much shareholders and creditors receive in an auction as 
long as the firm’s assets end up in their highest-value use. There are two reasons why shareholder 
and creditor receipts do matter. First, the more the firm’s claimants receive in bankruptcy states, 
the more the firm’s claims will sell for initially, and the greater the incentive the firm’s founders 
will  have in  setting up the firm. Second, in  the absence of  a competitive auction, the winning 
bidder may not be the highest-value user of the firm’s assets; that is, a competitive auction serves 
an important screening role in ensuring that the assets are indeed transferred to their best use. 
9. The costs of  financing a cash bid are akin to the costs of  an  initial public offering (IPO), 
which can be significant. For example, Ritter (1987) investigates two quantifiable components of 
the costs of  going public: direct expenses and underpricing. From a sample of firms that were 
taken public by  investment bankers in the United States during  1977-82,  he finds that these two 
costs together averaged between 21 and 32 percent of the realized market value of the securities 
issued, depending on the type of IPO. The underpricing effect can be attributed to the risk aversion 
of issuerdinvestment bankers, in conjunction with various forms of asymmetric information (see, 
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at hand: the former claimants (who were, after all, the previous risk bearers). 
Transactions costs would be reduced if bidders could reach this group directly 
by offering them securities in the postbankruptcy company. This is not allowed 
for in cash-only auctions like Chapter 7, but it is a key feature of Chapter  11 
(see below) and also of the procedure that we propose in section 16.3.’O 
A second reason for doubting the efficiency of a Chapter 7 proceeding con- 
cerns what we shall call the lack-of-competition  problem.  Although there may 
be many potential bidders who could in principle raise the necessary  funds, 
not all of them may participate. Preparing a bid is a costly and time-consuming 
process.II  Unfortunately,  only the winning bidder will recoup his costs, and 
this deters entry. In fact, in extreme cases, it may be an equilibrium for  just one 
bidder to enter the auction and win with a low price because all other potential 
bidders realize that entry would cause such a fierce competition that everyone 
would make losses. 
As Shleifer and Vishny (1992) have recently pointed out, both the financing 
problem and the lack-of-competition problem are likely to be exacerbated to 
the extent that the natural bidders for a bankrupt firm are other firms in  the 
same industry; these firms may also be  suffering financial distress and may 
therefore find it hard to raise capital.12 
15.2.2  Structured Bargaining 
If auctions cannot be relied on, what are the other possibilities? Many coun- 
tries have tried to provide a framework within which claimants can bargain 
about the future of the firm, that is, decide by structured negotiation  whether 
it should be liquidated or reorganized. A leading example of this in the West 
is Chapter 11 of the US.  Bankruptcy Code. 
The details of Chapter 11 are complicated, but the basic idea is the follow- 
ing: claimholders are grouped into classes according to the type of claim they 
have; committees or trustees are appointed to represent each class; and a judge 
supervises a process of bargaining among the committees to determine a plan 
of action for the firm, together with a division of value. During the process, 
incumbent management usually runs the firm. An important part of the proce- 
10. Note that we are not denying that managerial private information can also cause financing 
problems. For example, suppose that IBM’s management knows that the company is worth $100 
billion but the market does not. Then management may be unable to raise $100 billion to make a 
cash bid, and the company could be sold inefficiently. Unfortunately, it is not clear that this prob- 
lem lies in the province of bankruptcy law (nor is it clear that the law can help). As we argued in 
sec. 15.1,  the rationale for bankruptcy law is to deal with collective-action problems among credi- 
tors, yet this asymmetric information problem would arise even if there were a single creditor. 
I  1. For a compelling account of  the cost of a bidding process, see Burrough and Helyar (1990) 
on the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout. 
12. Shleifer and Vishny’s point is supported by  evidence from LoPucki and Whitford (1992, 
sec. IV), who find that, in the forty-three largest U.S. bankruptcy cases between 1979 and 1988, 
all asset sales were to existing companies, usually within the same line of business. 221  The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform 
dure is that a plan can be implemented if  it receives approval by  a suitable 
majority of each claimant class: unanimity is not required.13 
We believe that there are serious theoretical  and practical problems with 
Chapter 11 (and similar procedures). At a theoretical level, Chapter 11 mixes 
two decisions together: the decision of who should get what (i.e., whose debt 
should be forgiven, and by  how much), and the decision of what should be 
done with the firm (should it be liquidated or reorganized, and, if reorganized, 
who should manage it, and what should be its new financial structure). This 
latter decision creates an additional dimension of conflict. For example, senior 
creditors may press for liquidation (since they will then be paid off for sure), 
whereas junior claimants may hold out for reorganization (since they enjoy the 
upside potential but not the downside risk). There are already reasons to think 
that  bargaining  may  break  down  when  agents  negotiate  over  a given  pie 
(e.g., if there is asymmetric information among the agents); matters are merely 
made worse by having a further conflict of  interest over which pie should be 
chosen. 
In addition, placing decisions in the hands of representatives-and  indeed 
the supervising judge-creates  agency problems. Since individuals on share- 
holder and creditor committees own only a small fraction of  the equity and 
debt themselves, they are unlikely to devote the socially efficient level of re- 
sources to figuring out what a good reorganization  plan is. This may  leave 
the one informed group-management-with  considerable power to tilt the 
outcome of the bargaining toward reorganization  (and the retention of their 
jobs). Judges too can use their supervisory powers to pursue their own agendas, 
which may be in conflict with the claimants’ narrow objective of value maximi- 
zation. 
The empirical evidence appears to support the theoretical view that Chapter 
11 is imperfect. We mention a few relevant findings. (i) Chapter 11 can take a 
great deal of time.I4  (ii) During this time, there can be a serious loss in value- 
because  of  managerial  distraction,  incompetence,  or  negligence;  forgone 
investment opportunities; or a drop in demand (either because competitors be- 
13. Specifically, for a plan to be agreed to, it must receive approval by a two-thirds majority in 
value terms (and a simple majority in number terms) of each debt class and a two-thirds majority 
of  equity-although  under certain circumstances a plan can be forced on a class (the cram-down 
provision). 
A similar system to Chapter 1  I operates in Japan. Reorganization plans are drafted by a trustee 
appointed by  the court; the court can amend the plan in consultation with the interested parties; 
for a plan to be ratified, it must receive four-fifths of secured creditors’ approval and two-thirds of 
unsecured creditors’ approval (shareholders cannot veto); if the plan is not ratified, the company 
is liquidated (see Mitchell 1990). 
14. Flynn (1989) finds that nearly two-thirds of Chapter  11 confirmations occur in the second 
and third years after filing. LoPucki and Whitford (1992) find that the largest bankruptcy cases 
($100 million plus) spend an average of  two to three years in Chapter 11. Gilson, John, and Lang 
(1990) report a similar figure for exchange-listed companies in Chapter  11 between  1978 and 
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have more aggressively or because customers lose ~onfidence).’~  Also, suppli- 
ers may be unwilling to extend credit.’”  (iii) The procedure involves significant 
legal and administrative costs.17  (iv) The procedure appears to be soft on man- 
agement.18  (v)  Chapter  1  I  judges  sometimes  abuse  their  discretionary 
 power^.'^ 
15.2.3  Administration 
An alternative to structured bargaining is to appoint a “benign dictator’’- 
that is, to appoint  an administrator  who, through the court, has authority to 
decide which parts of  the firm should be  sold off  and which parts  (if any) 
maintained  as a going concern.  This is roughly  the way the French  system 
operates.*O (It is also roughly the way Chapter X of the old U.S. Bankruptcy 
Act operated prior to 1978.) Administration avoids many of the costs of Chap- 
ter  11 and is far less likely  to be a soft option for management (insofar as 
management is no longer in charge of  the firm). However, a lot of power is 
placed in the hands of the judge and administrator, who may have little or no 
background or expertise in the firm’s operations and little or no financial incen- 
tive to make the right decisions about the firm’s future. We know of no system- 
atic empirical work that evaluates the administration procedure, but there are 
certainly theoretical reasons for being skeptical about it.*’ 
IS. A  spectacular example of  loss  in  value is provided by  Eastern Airlines, which suffered 
operating losses of around $1.6 billion while in Chapter  I  I  from March 1989 until January 1991 
(see Weiss  1991). In examining the Texaco Chapter  11 bankruptcy (resulting from the Texaco- 
Pennzoil litigation), Cutler and Summers (1988) discovered losses of over $3 billion, which may 
be attributable to the costs of  financial distress. Other studies of the (indirect) costs of financial 
distress include Altman (1984), Baldwin and Mason (1983), White (1983), and Wruck (1990). 
16. Roe (1983, n. 2) cites the cases of Food Fair Inc., Wickes, and AM International, in which 
customers and, particularly, suppliers refused to trade with the companies after they had filed for 
bankruptcy, causing serious revenue losses. However, Chapter  11 also plays an  important role in 
facilitating debtor-in-possession financing, whereby suppliers’ credit is placed ahead of existing 
(unsecured) senior debt. (For more on debtor-in-possession financing, see sec. 15.6.4 below.) 
17. In a sample of New York  and American Stock Exchange firms that filed for bankruptcy 
between 1979 and 1986, Weiss (1990) estimated these direct costs to be 3.1 percent of the book 
value of debt plus market value of equity (measured prior to bankruptcy). 
18. Gilson (1989, 1990), Gilson and Vetsuypens (1992), LoPucki and Whitford (1992), and 
Betker (1992) show that senior managers often suffer as a result of their firms entering Chapter 
11. However, we think that the proper comparison should be between how  these managers are 
treatcd in Chapter  11 and how they would have been  treated in Chapter 7. In the latter, one can 
presume that far more of them would have lost their jobs (and far more quickly). So, relative tu 
Chapter 7, Chapter 11 is likely to be a soft option. 
19. Weiss (1991) argues persuasively that the presiding judge in the case of Eastern Airlines 
was quite determined to maintain the company in business despite huge losses incurred while in 
Chapter 11. LoPucki and Whitford (1992) cite the Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases of Johns-Manville 
and Evans Products to demonstrate the exercise of judicial power at the extreme. 
20. Under the French bankruptcy law enacted in  1985, the court can accept a reorganization 
plan without the approval of creditors (or workers), provided that it best ensures the maintenance 
of employment and the repayment of creditors. (Note that these two objectives may be in conflict.) 
See Mitchell (1990). 
21. Since 1986, the U.K. bankruptcy system has also made use of an administrator-although, 
compared to France, creditors have greater powers to reject the administrator’s reorganization plan. 223  The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform 
15.2.4  Automatic Financial Restructuring 
So far we have discussed procedures that are used in practice. Another possi- 
bility, which has been suggested by some scholars, is that bankruptcy should 
merely  trigger  an automatic  financial restructuring-for  example,  all debts 
could be converted into equity in some prespecified  manner.**  Then the deci- 
sion whether to liquidate or reorganize would be left to management (possibly 
constrained by the market for corporate control). 
We  believe that this  approach to bankruptcy is flawed because it ignores 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. In practice, managers, 
who enjoy private benefits of control, may be unwilling to shrink or liquidate 
an unprofitable company of their own accord. Moreover, the market for corpo- 
rate control may not work well enough to force them to do so.23  Under these 
conditions, debt plays an important role in constraining or bonding managers 
to act in the interests of securityholders. Specifically, the managers of  a highly 
leveraged firm face a choice: reduce slack, or go bankrupt.24 
Of course, for the bonding role of debt to be effective, management must 
suffer a significant penalty for nonpayment of debts, that is, for going bank- 
rupt. But, under an automatic financial restructuring, there is no penalty at all: 
managers are in effect allowed to postpone or cancel debts and to continue to 
run the firm as if nothing had happened! 
The U.K. administration system is in a sense a cross between the French system and Chapter  11 
in the United States. In the United Kingdom, a bankruptcy court issues an administrative order 
outlining particular goals to be achieved and appoints an administrator who takes control of the 
firm and, within three months, prepares a reorganization plan. Ratification of a plan requires ap- 
proval by  at least half (in value terms) of the (unsecured) creditors. In principle, the court could 
bypass a negative vote and proceed at its own discretion. However, in practice, if the vote is nega- 
tive, the court either convenes another creditors’ meeting or appoints a receiver who liquidates the 
firm (see e.g., Mitchell 1990; and Webb 1991). 
22. For  instance, using the  scheme  proposed by  Bebchuk  (1988). For  more on  Bebchuk’s 
scheme, see below. 
23. Even a very badly run firm may not be vulnerable to a (hostile) takeover. One reason is that 
a raider may have to share a large fraction of the takeover gains with shareholders of the target 
firm  because (i) minority shareholders can free-ride on the raider’s offer (see Grossman and Hart 
1980) or (ii) rival bidders can free-ride on the information embodied in an initial offer and make 
a counteroffer. Hence, a raider may fail to cover the ex ante costs of making a bid. (The evidence 
does indeed show that most of the gains from a successful takeover accrue to shareholders of the 
target firm rather than to the acquiring firm [see Jensen and Ruback 19831.) Further factors deter- 
ring a raider are management’s ability to engage in  various defensive measures (lawsuits, poison 
pills, employee stock ownership plans) or, at the last moment, to carry out the actions the raider 
was planning to undertake. 
An alternative mechanism for removing badly performing managers-or,  more accurately, di- 
rectors-is  a proxy fight. However, incumbents have the upper hand in  a proxy fight because 
(i) they can use company funds to fight their campaign, whereas an insurgent typically cannot, and 
(ii) there is inevitably an element of “the devil you know is better than the devil you don’t’’ (the 
insurgent, after all, is not offering something tangible like cash). 
Note finally that, in practice, large premiums of 30 percent or more are earned by shareholders 
of target firms in takeovers (see, e.g., Jensen and Ruback 1983). These premiums are consistent 
with the existence of substantial slack in target firms prior to a takeover. 
24. On the bonding role of debt, see Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986). For evidence 
that the bonding role of debt is important in practice, see Jensen (1986) and Hart (1993). 224  Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore 
15.2.5  Summary 
In sum, we see flaws in all four kinds of bankruptcy procedures that we have 
discussed. Auctions (like Chapter 7) can lead to inefficient liquidation at fire- 
sale prices. Structured bargaining  (like Chapter 11) is unlikely to work with 
large numbers of claimants given that they have different objectives. Adminis- 
tration procedures (as in France) place too much control in the hands of one 
person, who may not have the necessary expertise. Automatic financial restruc- 
turing eliminates the bonding role of  debt. Thus, it seems desirable to con- 
sider  alternative^.^^ 
15.3  A New Bankruptcy Procedure 
A fully fledged  analysis of bankruptcy  would  derive optimal bankruptcy 
procedure from first principles. Unfortunately, this is an extraordinarily diffi- 
cult task, not least because, as we noted in section IS.  1, in an ideal world there 
would  be no need for a state procedure  at all:  debtors  and creditors  would 
choose their own bankruptcy procedure as part of an optimal debt contract.26 
What is really needed is a full theory of contractual incompleteness based on 
transactions  costs, which we do not yet have. Thus, while we have tried to 
provide some foundations for our proposed bankruptcy procedure, what fol- 
lows must be seen as quite tentative. 
In broad terms, we think that a good bankruptcy procedure is one that meets 
two goals: goal 1 is that it maximizes the ex post value of  the firm (with an 
25. One argument that we have not dealt with runs as follows: why have a “good” bankruptcy 
procedure at all? After all, there is nothing to stop the interested parties from renegotiating to 
avoid bankruptcy. In fact, this is exactly what we see in prebankruptcy workouts between firms 
and their creditors. However, such workouts may fail-inter  aha because of holdout and free-rider 
problems and asymmetries of information among claimants. In a study of the companies listed on 
the New York and American Stock Exchanges that were in severe financial distress during 1978- 
87, Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) found that workouts fail more than 50 percent of  the time and 
are more likely to fail the larger the number of creditors (see also Gilson 1991). 
In the last few years, “prepackaged” bankruptcies have emerged as a new hybrid form in the 
United  States. These informal reorganizations-agreed  on before entering  into bankruptcy- 
avoid some of  the costs of Chapter 11 but take advantage of the fact that within Chapter  11 a 
reorganization plan can be ratified by a smaller fraction of creditors than would be needed outside 
bankruptcy. (Hence a prepackaged bankruptcy may be easier to implement than a workout.) How- 
ever, by  no means all financially distressed firms can be  rescued this way; as McConnell and 
Servaes (1991) conclude, “A  pre-packaged bankruptcy . . . is not likely to be useful in resolving 
complex, litigious disputes among hundreds of creditor groups with sharply divergent interests- 
the kind we often see in a traditional, highly contentious Chapter 11 reorganization” (see also 
Gilson, John, and Lang 1990, sec. 2.3). 
26. In an ideal world, parties can write “comprehensive” contracts. A comprehensive contract 
is one where, at the outset, everyone’s obligations are sufficiently clearly stated that the contract 
never has to be renegotiated as the state of the world unfolds. (That is, if in equilibrium parties 
ever recontract ex post, then they could have built in the outcome of this renegotiation ex ante.) 
In the absence of comprehensive contracts-i.e.,  where contracts are “incomplete”-there  will 
sometimes be occasion to renegotiate. In the present context, bankruptcy is a clear example of 
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appropriate distribution of  this value across claimants); goal 2 is that it pre- 
serves the (ex ante) bonding role of debt by penalizing management adequately 
in bankruptcy states. 
It is worth pointing out that goals 1 and 2 may be in conflict. For example, 
if 2 were the only issue, then there would be nothing wrong with a “nuke-the- 
firm” strategy: any firm that went bankrupt could simply be shut down. How- 
ever, such a strategy may  be disastrous in terms of  l:  given the presence of 
uncertainty, even well-run firms will sometimes go bankrupt, and it would ob- 
viously be very inefficient to close them all down. Equally, if  1 were the only 
goal, incumbent managers might be retained a lot of the time on account of 
their special knowledge or skills, which would be bad in terms of 2. 
We  now outline our procedure. It is an attempt, first, to  strike a balance 
between goal 1 and goal 2 and, second, to achieve a point on the “frontier” of 
feasible combinations-that  is, to maximize ex post value, subject to an ade- 
quate amount of bonding. 
15.3.1  The Proposed Procedure 
At the outset, after the firm has declared (or been pushed into) bankruptcy, 
the firm’s debts are canceled. The firm’s  creditors do not  go away  empty- 
handed, however; as described in task B below, they may well become signifi- 
cant shareholders. What matters is that the firm starts out life in bankruptcy 
essentially as a “new,” all-equity company. 
An  individual-a  judge, say-is  appointed to supervise the process. The 
judge has two immediate tasks: task A is to solicit cash and noncash bids for 
the new all-equity firm, task B is to allocate rights to the shares in this firm. 
We  anticipate that these tasks could be carried out in parallel and completed 
within a prespecified period of time; three months might be reasonable. 
Task A: Soliciting Bids 
The judge solicits bids for the firm’s assets and proposals for the firm’s con- 
tinuing operations. That is, over the three-month period, individuals are en- 
couraged to make cash bids for all or parts of the firm’s operations; in addition, 
management teams (including the incumbent) are encouraged to make propos- 
als for how to run the firm as a continuing entity. 
In fact, it turns out that, in a formal sense, there is no real difference between 
a bid for the firm and a proposal to run the firm as a continuing entity, once we 
allow for noncash bids. For example, if  management (either the incumbent 
team or a new one) proposes to maintain the firm as a going concern with an 
all-equity financial structure, this is equivalent to their making the following 
“bid” for the firm: “We are prepared to buy each share of the present firm for 
no cash down and one share in the (identical) postbankruptcy firm.” Similarly, 
if  management wishes to deviate from an all-equity financial structure for (fu- 
ture) tax or bonding reasons, it can arrange to borrow $D in the capital market 
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share in the (leveraged) postbankruptcy firm. Another way for management to 
obtain leverage is to offer each shareholder a share and a bond in the postbank- 
Thus, it is useful to think of the judge simply soliciting a variety of cash and 
noncash bids rather than a set of bids for the firm’s assets on the one hand and 
a set of restructuring plans on the other. 
Task B: Allocating Rights 
Before the judge can allocate rights to the shares of the new  (all-equity) 
firm, he must first determine who the firm’s claimants were and the amounts 
and priority of their claims. For example, if the firm owed taxes to the govern- 
ment, is that claim senior or junior to a claim by workers for unpaid wages or 
for pension benefits? How do these claims compare in priority to a claim by a 
secured or senior debtholder? Where do trade creditors or future tort claimants 
fit into the picture? If the firm recently borrowed $1,000 for one year at a rate 
of interest of 10 percent but the rate of interest has now fallen to 5 percent, is 
this creditor owed $1,000 or $1,100/1.05? 
These are complicated  questions, which have to be answered currently in 
both a Chapter 7 and a Chapter 11 bankruptcy.*’ Since we have nothing new to 
say about the answers, we shall simply assume that some procedure is adopted 
(possibly existing U.S. procedure) for determining the amount and priority of 
all claims. 
Thus, we suppose that the judge’s deliberations will lead to the identification 
of  n classes of creditors who were owed (in total) the amounts D,, . . . ,  D,,, 
respectively, with class I having the most senior claim, class 2 the next most 
senior claim, and so on. The firm’s shareholders form the (n + l)th  class, with 
a claim junior to all others. 
Having identified these classes, the judge can proceed to allocate rights to 
shares in the new  (all-equity)  firm. If the “true” value,  of  the firm were 
publicly known (i.e., were verifiable), then it would be easy to figure out the 
total (monetary) amount S8  each class i should get, based on absolute priority. 
The most senior creditors, class  1, should receive the smaller of the amount 
they are owed, D,  and the total amount available, V; that is, 
S, =  min(D,, v). 
Class i (i = 2, . . . ,n) should receive the smaller of  the total amount they are 
owed, D,, and the total amount available after class  (i - 1) has been paid off; 
that is, 
ruptcy firm. 
Sl = min(4, V -  S, -  S2 -  . . . -  S$-,). 
Finally, the equityholders should receive anything that is left over; that is, 
sn+,  = v -  (S, + . . . + S,). 
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Unfortunately, V is typically not known. However, Bebchuk (1988) has con- 
structed a scheme that achieves  absolute priority in  spite of  this  drawback. 
Note that, although Bebchuk’s scheme is ingenious, it may be regarded as too 
complicated in some circumstances. In section 16.5, we describe some sim- 
pler alternatives. 
Bebchuk’s scheme works as follows. The most senior class (class 1) is allo- 
cated 100  percent of the firm’s equity (so, if an individual creditor in that class 
is owed d,,  he receives a fraction d,lD, of the firm’s shares); however, the firm 
has the right to “redeem” this claim (i.e., buy back the equity) at a price of D, 
per  100 percent-that  is, for the amount this class is owed. Investors in the 
next most senior class (class 2) are given the option to buy equity at a price of 
D,  per 100 percent; however, the firm has the right to redeem this claim at a 
price of D, per 100  percent-that  is, for the amount this class is owed.**  More 
generally, class i investors (3  5 i 5 n)  have the option to buy equity at a price 
of (D,  + D, + . . . + Di-,)  per 100 percent, but the firm can redeem this right 
at a price of Dl per 100 percent. Finally, shareholders (class [n  + 11) are given 
the option to buy equity at a price of (D,  + .  . . + Dn)  per 100 percent.29 
This completes the judge’s second task, task B. 
Once the three months are up, the judge reveals the bids arising from task 
A, and everyone can make an assessment of their worth (possibly with the help 
of some outside expert, such as an investment bank [see n. 35 below]). At this 
point, optionholders are given some period of time-a  further month, say-to 
exercise their options. (During this period, there can be trade in equity and 
options, although the process does not depend on this.) At the end of this fourth 
month, some options will have been exercised, and others will not. The firm 
(i.e., the judge) uses the receipts from the options exercised to make redemp- 
tions-starting  with the most senior claimants and working down the seniority 
until the receipts have been used up. These redemptions balance the options 
exercised in such a way that exactly 100 percent of the firm’s equity is allocated 
at all times.30 
The final step in  the  process  is that the  firm’s  equityholders  (i.e.,  those 
people who hold equity in the firm at the end of month 4) vote on which of the 
28. Shortly, we will explain when these options, and buyback rights, can be exercised. 
29. For example, let n = 2,  D,  = $100, D,  = $200; i.e., there are two classes of creditors 
who were owed $100 and $200, respectively. Let there be  100 people in each class and also 100 
shareholders and  100 shares of the firm  outstanding. Then the first class of creditors is given one 
share each, each member of the second class is given the option to buy one share for 0,/100 = 
$1.00, and each shareholder is given the option to buy a share for (D,  + D,)/lOO = $3.00. 
30. To  continue our example from n. 29, suppose that, on the basis of the bids announced by 
the judge, the firm is generally perceived to be worth between $100 and $300. Then no sharehold- 
ers will exercise their options, but all junior creditors will exercise theirs. The judge takes the 
receipts of $100 and uses the money to redeem the senior creditors’ rights for $1.00 each, transfer- 
ring their shares to the junior creditors. At the end of the process, all the equity is in the junior 
creditors’ hands, and all the senior creditors have been fully paid off. The shareholders neither pay 
nor receive anything. 
It should be clear from this example that Bebchuk’s scheme preserves absolute priority in the 
following sense. If class i creditors (1 5 i 5 n)  are (fully) paid off, then this must mean that some 
lower class exercised their options. But then all creditors senior to class i are also (fully) paid off. 228  Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore 
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Fig. 15.1  Bankruptcy: Sequence of events 
various cash and noncash bids to select. (Voting is on the basis of one share, 
one vote; in sec.  16.6.6, we discuss the voting procedure  further.)  Once the 
vote is completed, the firm emerges from the bankruptcy proce~s.~' 
The sequence of events is summarized in figure 15.1. 
15.4  An Assessment 
In our view, one of the strengths of our proposal is that, in a precise sense, 
it embraces all the options currently available within both Chapter 7 and Chap- 
ter  11. In a Chapter 7 auction, anyone is free to make a cash bid for the firm; 
that is, liquidation and sale are both feasible. Our mechanism admits such out- 
comes too. Chapter 11 allows for the formulation of a reorganizatiodrecapital- 
ization plan. Any such plan is allowed for in our mechanism too because it can 
always be expressed in the fomi of a noncash bid. Thus, minimally, everything 
that is feasible within either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 is also feasible within 
our proposal. 
We believe that our procedure  improves on  Chapters 7 and  11. In  section 
15.2.1, we highlighted two problems with a cash-only auction like Chapter 7: 
the financing problem and the lack-ofcompetition problem. The major advan- 
tage of our proposal is that, by  permitting  noncash bids, it reduces  (or even 
eliminates)  the financing problem.  The reason  is that a bidder  who is cash 
constrained or who does not want to bear the risk of holding a large fraction 
of the company shares himself, even in the short term, can share risks with the 
old claimants by offering them securities in the new company directly. In con- 
3 1. Note that old claimants who become new shareholders in the firm  do not have to remain as 
such. For example, a former trade creditor who becomes a shareholder can sell his shares once a 
market develops (and can vote with this prospect in mind). 
Our procedure differs in an important way from the recent bankruptcy proposal of Bradley and 
Rosenzweig (1992). They suggest that, in  the event of bankruptcy, the firm's  equity should be 
transferred to creditors (unless the equityholders are prepared to buy out the creditors for what is 
owed), but they do not discuss how this leads to better management (or liquidation) of the firm. 
That is, they do not explain how a (possibly dispersed) group of creditors goes about replacing 
management, By contrast, in our scheme, the solicitation of cash and noncash bids, together with 
an  automatic vote, provides a mechanism by  which management can be removed. (For more on 
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trast, Chapter 7 requires an extra step: the bidder must raise cash from one 
group (the new investors) in order to pay another group (the old  claimant^).^^ 
Our procedure does not deal directly with the lack-of-competition problem. 
However, allowing noncash bids is likely to mitigate it. Parties may be deterred 
from bidding given the cost of financing a bid. Noncash bids will help indi- 
rectly by reducing these costs. This is likely to raise the number of eventual 
bidders and therefore also to increase the competitiveness of the auction and 
the value of the winning bid. 
Our procedure  also  improves  on a  structured  bargaining  procedure  like 
Chapter 11 in a number of ways. Principally, we have substituted a simple vote 
by shareholders (whose interests are aligned) for protracted and complex bar- 
gaining among different claimant groups (whose interests typically 
Also, agency costs are much reduced: our procedure leaves little or no discre- 
tionary power in the hands of the judge, management, or creditor/shareholder 
 representative^.^^ 
It is worth comparing our procedure to the automatic financial restructuring 
proposal discussed in section 15.2.4, whereby a firm’s debts are canceled and 
market  forces  determine  whether  it  should be  liquidated.  Such  a proposal 
would leave incumbent management in place, unless and until it is removed. 
Our procedure is quite different. In our scheme, no one has the right of incum- 
bency until specifically voted in by the shareholders: this is the prime purpose 
of having an obligatory vote. 
We think that this feature of our scheme is crucial. In the course of normal 
business (outside bankruptcy),  management  is constrained in various  ways. 
Aside from direct incentive schemes, managers (more precisely, directors) are 
subject to removal by a proxy fight or a takeover bid. As we mentioned earlier 
(see n. 23 above), both these mechanisms are-perhaps  with reason-biased 
in favor of incumbent management. We  think that, to maintain  the bonding 
32. Note that, in the main version of our proposal described in sec. 15.3, the old claimants are 
treated equally in the sense that each is offered (rights to) the same package of securities in the 
new company (some combination of equity, cash, and bonds, say). This is not essential, however. 
For example, one of the firm’s previous creditors might be a large bank, which has a comparative 
advantage in monitoring the lower tail of the firm’s cash earnings. It may be very inefficient for 
this creditor to be allocated a large amount of  equity in the new company. There is a simple way 
round this problem, however. Management could propose a reorganization plan in which the bank 
agrees to become a large creditor of the firm, in return for selling back its equity to the firm. The 
only difficulty with this is that it can raise a conflict of  interest: the bank, as a former creditor, will 
be able to vote on a deal from which it may well be benefiting substantially. We discuss ways of 
dealing with this kind of conflict in sec. 15.6.2. 
33. It would be too strong to say that our procedure eliminates all conflicts of interest among 
claimants. Some claimants may be workers or other firms that have contractual relations with the 
bankrupt firm. These parties will be interested in more than just the market value of their equity 
and hence may have goals different from those of  the average shareholder. We suspect that the 
resultant conflicts of  interest are likely to be  small relative to those between shareholders and 
creditors or among creditors in a standard Chapter 11 proceeding. 
34. Except, of course, for the crucial role of the bankruptcy judge in deciding who is owed what 
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role of debt, it is essential that incumbent management is not favored within 
bankruptcy. That is why the vote is important. The vote establishes a playing 
field that is at most flat and, we suspect, more typically, tilted in favor of outsid- 
ers. Incumbent managers have to persuade their shareholders to vote them back 
into office, probably  against competition  from  a cash buyer. Shareholders, 
choosing between cash in hand and a noncash offer (of uncertain value) from 
the very management team that has just brought the firm to its knees, may well 
vote for the cash.”  That is, except when it is clear that the bankruptcy was due 
to events outside management’s control, incumbent management is quite likely 
to be booted 
There is a further aspect of  the treatment of  management that we should 
address. It might be argued that penalizing management harshly in bankruptcy 
is counterproductive since it will cause managers of financially distressed firms 
to delay filing for bankruptcy or to “go for broke”-that  is, to engage in risky, 
but inefficient, behavior to stave off bankruptcy. People who take this position 
often go on to advocate a soft procedure like Chapter 11, which treats manage- 
ment relatively  well.  We  are not  persuaded  by  this  argument. If  the  state- 
provided bankruptcy mechanism is harsh, it seems relatively easy for a firm to 
soften it ex ante. If those people choosing the corporation’s financial structure 
wish to protect managers from the unpleasantness of bankruptcy, they can do 
so by  choosing a low debt-equity ratio or by issuing senior debt to managers 
so that they receive something in bankruptcy states (a form of  “golden para- 
chute”)  .37 
In contrast, it is much more difficult for a firm to harden a soft bankruptcy 
procedure. Suppose, for example, that the statutory  procedure  specifies that 
incumbent management should be left in place for a minimum period of time. 
Consider some firm that wants to ensure that its own managers will be removed 
35. This raises a more general issue. It may be unreasonable to expect (possibly quite small) 
shareholders to have the knowledge or incentive to assess noncash offers. One solution would be 
for the judge to hire an investment bank to value the various offers. The investment bank could 
also check whether the financing for each proposal is secure. (The bank’s fees might be in the 
form of securities in the postbankruptcy firm.) 
36. Note that the process of  comparing cash and noncash bids that we have advocated is not 
completely unfamiliar  in  the corporate context.  Firms  that are  undergoing  leveraged buyouts 
(LBOs) face something similar. There the incumbent management team typically makes a bid to 
take the firm private. Other groups often show an interest too, and a subset of the board’s disinter- 
ested (or independent) directors is charged with conducting an auction. At the end of this auction, 
the disinterested directors will approve one of the bids or decide that the status quo is better for 
shareholders (is., that the company should remain public). 
The major difference between the LBO process and the one advocated here is that, in the LBO 
case, the bids are decided on by  shareholder representatives while, in our case, they are decided 
on by  the shareholders directly. (Even in an LBO, a decision to take the company private would 
have to be ratified by  shareholders.) 
37. Also, if a “harsh” procedure causes management to delay filing for bankruptcy for too long, 
then this problem can be mitigated by making it easier for creditors to push a firm into bankruptcy 
of their own accord-e.g.,  debt could have stronger covenants attached to it (which are more likely 
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quickly in bankruptcy. The firm cannot achieve this by merely fine-tuning the 
existing procedure, since any attempt to remove management will, by assump- 
tion, not be respected by  the courts. Instead, the firm  will have to opt out of 
the statutory (soft) procedure and write its own private (hard) procedure; but, 
as we have argued in section 15.1, this may be very costly. Given this asymme- 
try-it  is easier to soften a hard mechanism than to harden  a soft one-our 
conclusion is that the state’s bankruptcy procedure should err on the hard side 
rather than the soft.38 
15.5  Simpler Methods of Allocating Equity 
We have advocated using Bebchuk’s relatively sophisticated-although  con- 
ceptually not at all difficult-mechanism  for allocating equity. Some people 
may argue that this mechanism is too complicated for practical purposes and 
that a simpler scheme should be found. 
A useful way to explore this matter further is to begin by considering what 
happens in Bebchuk’s mechanism if junior claimants (either junior creditors or 
shareholders) are cash constrained-so  that they are unable to exercise their 
options when they perceive that the firm is valuable and the market for options 
is sufficiently underdeveloped that they cannot easily sell them. (This is likely 
to be a particular problem in Eastern Europe.) 
At first glance, this may not appear to be a serious problem. For instance, if 
a junior securityholder (say, an old equityholder) has the option to buy equity 
at a price below what he considers it is worth but does not have the cash on 
hand to do so, then he could always borrow short term, offering the equity as 
collateral for the  loan,  and  then  sell the equity  (at a profit)  once the  firm 
emerges from bankruptcy. However, this argument overlooks the fact that his 
perception of  the future value of the firm’s equity may not be shared by  his 
potential creditors; if they are less optimistic than he is and he cannot offer 
them anything else by way of collateral, then he will not be able to borrow the 
cash needed to exercise his option. 
But does it matter if options cannot be exercised? The net effect of a failure 
in the options “market” is to leave more equity in the hands of senior creditors 
than is warranted by the face value of their debt. Arguably, this redistribution 
of the firm’s value (disproportionately into the hands of senior creditors) does 
not matter since claims have still been homogenized so as to remove the scope 
for ex post bargaining, and the new equityholders (mainly the old senior credi- 
tors) should therefore still vote for the best bid. Of course, there would appear 
to be some unfairness. But in principle this potential transfer of wealth from 
38. However, as we argued at the start of  sec. 15.3, a good bankruptcy procedure should strike 
a balance between penalizing management (in order to preserve the bonding role of  debt) and 
maximizing the ex post value of the firm. That is why we do not advocate as harsh a procedure as 
Chapter 7. Our procedure is “softer” on management than Chapter 7 because management (along 
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junior to senior claimants would be priced in the ex ante securities markets 
anyway, so the “unfairness” is more apparent than real. 
This is an intriguing argument because it raises the larger question, Why 
should one bother  using  Bebchuk’s mechanism when  an  even  simpler rule 
could be used? Some possible alternatives are the following: 
1. Once the bids (both cash and noncash) have been assembled, one or more 
outside investment banks could be employed to assess them and to estimate 
the value,  v’,  of  the best one. Shares could then be  allocated  according  to 
absolute priority, taking  v’,  as ifit were the true value of the firm (i.e., as in 
Chapter 7, except that it is equity, not cash, that is being distributed). Share- 
holders would then vote to choose what they consider to be the best bid, just 
as in section 15.3. 
2. As in alternative  1, except that  the highest cash bid,  V’-which  is an 
objective amount-is  used in lieu of v’ as a basis for distributing equity. 
3. Equity might be allocated in proportion to thefuce value of claims-with, 
say, x percent reserved for old equityholders,  where x 2 0 is some prespeci- 
fied number. 
4. An even cruder rule than 3 would be to allocate all the equity to senior 
creditors, regardless of the face value of their claims (indeed, this would be the 
outcome of our proposed scheme in the extreme case where no options were 
exercised because of cash constraints). 
These four alternative rules are consistent with the basic features of our pro- 
posal: first, noncash as well as cash bids are allowed so that reorganization is 
given a fair chance; second, a homogeneous group of  new  equityholders  is 
created who get to vote on the future of the firm; and, third, the old manage- 
ment faces the discipline of having to bid to keep their jobs. The sense in which 
these simple rules are inferior to our proposed scheme is that they may fail to 
preserve absolute priority: they typically give either too much or too little to 
junior claimants relative  to senior.  (In  1, e.g.,  v’ may overestimate the true 
value, r! of the firm, in which case junior claimants receive too much. In 2, V 
may be well below the value,  of  the best noncash bid, in which case junior 
claimants receive too little.) If cash constraints are not a problem, the strength 
of  the Bebchuk scheme is that it is a market-based mechanism that preserves 
absolute priority. But, if one suspects that in practice the scheme would not 
work (and hence fail to respect absolute priority), then it may be better to opt 
for something simpler, along the lines of one of the above  alternative^.^^ 
39. Even if one were to opt for one of the alternative rules 1-4,  there would be a strong argument 
for supplementing it with Bebchuk options: i.e., class 2 creditors could be given the right to buy 
out the most senior (class  I) creditors at price D,;  class 3 could be given the right to buy out both 
classes I  and 2 at price D, + D2;  etc. This would at least give some power of redress to aggrieved 
individual junior claimants who feel that senior claimants are getting more than they are owed. 
Readers may wonder why the preservation of  absolute priority is important at all. Aside from 
the basic point that, ceteris paribus, it is always better to respect the provisions of private contracts, 
there are at least two other arguments. First, any discrepancy between what a class of claimants 
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15.6  Further Considerations 
Of course many details of our proposal remain to be sorted out. In this sec- 
tion, we briefly raise some ancillary issues. We  should stress that we do not 
have definite answers to a number of questions. There may be room for several 
answers, depending on the circumstances of the firm: indeed, one can imagine 
firms opting for different choices ex ante. 
15.6.1  Claim Disputes 
We have taken the view that a judge could fairly quickly decide on who is 
owed what and with what priority-say  within three months. This may be too 
optimi~tic.~~  It can be argued that one advantage of a Chapter 7 sell-off is that 
the receipts can be safely held in some (interest-bearing) escrow account until 
such time as the conflicting claims have been resolved. By contrast, if the firm 
is to survive as a going concern, such delays could be fatal. 
In  practice, it matters just how big a slice of the pie is in dispute. If, for 
example, 90 percent of the prior claims can be decided on within three months, 
then the judge could proceed in the manner we have suggested, with these 90 
percent of claimants being allocated equity/options (as if the disputed 10 per- 
cent do not exist). The 90 percent then vote.4’ Any cash that is generated- 
either as part of the winning bid or in the form of subsequent debt repayments/ 
dividends-is  held in an escrow account by  the judge pending a resolution of 
the  outstanding  10 percent  of  claims.  Once resolved,  successful  claimants 
could be issued fresh equity in the firm according to the seniority and value of 
their claims (that is, the equity holdings of the original 90 percent would be 
diluted), and the cash held in the escrow account could be distributed appropri- 
ately. In short, the fact that certain claims are in dispute need not hold up the 
bankruptcy proceeding. 
15.6.2  Dominant Voters 
Left as it is, our proposal would be vulnerable to exploitation of the minority 
by  a dominant shareholder.  Suppose that, just prior to the vote being taken, 
someone ended up with more than half the shares. There are a number of ways 
in which this person could abuse his voting power. For example, he could vote 
to accept an artificially low cash offer from a second firm in which he has a 
ex post-with  some people bribing management into deliberately precipitating bankruptcy and 
other people attempting to forestall bankruptcy. Second, as shown in Hart  and Moore (1990), the 
seniority structure of a firm’s capital provides an important instrument for constraining manage- 
ment’s ability to raise fresh capital; any arbitrary tampering with seniority rules within bankruptcy 
will typically reduce the flexibility of this instrument. 
40. Douglas Baird (1992) suggests that much of a lengthy Chapter I1  proceeding can in fact be 
devoted to this issue. 
41. There is no reason to suppose that the vote of the remaining 10 percent would be systemati- 
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large stake. Or he could vote himself  into control and sell the firm’s assets 
cheaply to the second firm. 
This problem is, of course, not new. It is a potential problem for any publicly 
traded company, and there exist laws to protect minority shareholders (boards 
of directors have fiduciary responsibilities). Indeed, under Chapter 11, minor- 
ity creditors (within a class) need protection, in the form of equal treatment. 
However, it seems clear that existing law would not be able to protect minority 
interests under our bankruptcy procedure. The procedure  would need to be 
amended in various ways-for  example, to disallow voting by someone who 
has an interest in a bidder’s firm. Another possibility  would be (1) to grant a 
suitably sized minority of the shareholders the power to veto any winning bid 
that is a noncash bid (this would help prevent a dominant shareholder from 
voting in a bad noncash bid) and (2)  to insist that a cash bid can be accepted 
only if it is the highest cash bid (this would help prevent a dominant share- 
holder from voting in a bad cash bid). 
15.6.3  Secured Creditors 
The issue here is the following: in bankruptcy, should the secured creditors 
of a firm be allowed to seize collateralized property? At present, US. bank- 
ruptcy law basically  prevents  such seizure, and we would not favor it either 
because  it  could  lead  to  an  inefficient  dismantlement  of  the  firm’s assets 
through a “me-first” grab.42 
We envisage that, in our proposal, a secured creditor might be treated much 
as he would be under present U.S. bankruptcy  law. Namely, the value of  the 
collateral is appraised; let this amount be $S. Suppose that the level of secured 
debt is $D. On the one hand,  if  the  debt is oversecured  (S > D),  then  the 
creditor is granted his full $D in senior debt. On the other hand, if the debt is 
undersecured (S < D), then the creditor is given only $S of senior debt; the 
remainder, $(D -  S), is treated as unsecured (‘junior)  debt. 
15.6.4  Debtor-in-Possession Financing 
The viability of  certain kinds of bankrupt firms (such as retail stores) can 
depend crucially on management being granted debtor-in-possession  financ- 
ing, whereby  suppliers’ credit is placed ahead of  existing (unsecured) senior 
debt.  (This is often mentioned as an important role played by  Chapter  11.) 
There is no reason why a comparable arrangement could not be used during 
the “four months” of our proposed bankruptcy process, with the judge’s ap- 
proval. In addition, for the sake of continuity, it is probably desirable to allow 
management to run the company during the bankruptcy process, under the su- 
pervision of the judge (again, as in Chapter 11). 
42. Under present U.S. law, a secured creditor may be able to seize his collateral if he can 
demonstrate that the property is not necessary for the firm’s reorganization and that it is worth less 
than the amount he is owed (see Baird 1992, sec. 8C).  A comparable rule could be adopted under 
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15.6.5  Partial Bids 
We  have tacitly  assumed that the bids received  are for the entire firm. In 
fact, bids may be for parts of the firm. The problem then arises as to how to 
deal with overlappinghnconsistent bids. Before a vote can be taken, a menu of 
coherent options has to be assembled. 
We think that there is no alternative but to leave the matter of  assembling 
“whole” bids in the hands of the judge and his or her appointed agents. It may 
well be necessary to solicit supplementary bids for parts of the firm, in order 
to package a whole bid. Although this seems messy, it should be noted that a 
similar difficulty is faced in a Chapter 7 proceeding: how to bundlehnbundle 
the assets of the firm so as to maximize cash receipts. 
15.6.6  Voting Procedures 
Another issue concerns the voting procedure per se. If there are only two 
bids, it seems natural to have a simple vote between them. However, with more 
than two bids, there are many possibilities. Shareholders could cast their votes 
for their most preferred plan, with the plan with the most votes being the win- 
ner; or shareholders could rank the plans, with the plan with the highest total 
ranking being the winner; or there could be two rounds, where shareholders 
rank the plans in the first round and there is a runoff between the two highest- 
ranked plans in the second round. One point to note is that thorny issues in 
voting theory  (such as the Condorcet paradox) are less likely to arise in the 
present context, given that shareholders have a common objective: value max- 
imization. 
15.7  Implementing the Proposed Procedure in Eastern Europe 
In this section, we raise some basic questions concerning the implementa- 
tion of the above scheme in the context of Eastern Europe. Let us stress the 
following: we envisage that our procedure would apply primarily to the case 
of the (subsequent) bankruptcy of new private or newly privatized fim1s.4~ 
A first source of  difficulty in implementing our (or any other) bankruptcy 
procedure in East European countries lies in the insufficient number of quali- 
fied lawyers and judges. However, unlike both Chapter 11 and other systems 
outside the United States, our procedure  attempts to minimize the need for 
lawyers by reducing the role of the courts to mainly supervisory functions. No 
decision or arbitration concerning  a firm’s future  needs  to be made by  the 
courts as long as the bankruptcy procedure is followed by the firm’s creditors 
and shareholders, and therefore no particular expertise in the firm’s operations 
is required from either judges or lawyers. 
In this respect, our procedure has the advantage of being potentially enforce- 
43. Nevertheless, elements of our proposal might be of  use for the purpose of debt restructuring 
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able using the existing judiciary system-that  is, without having to introduce 
bankruptcy courts run by  specialized judges. But it should be noted that the 
judge (or administrator) will need accounting skills in order to determine who 
had what claims, and of  what seniority,  in the insolvent firm. One solution 
during the transition phase could be for a well-established accounting firm not 
only to perform this task but also to allocate shares and options (Task B) and 
to supervise the process of exercising options. Foreign accounting firms that 
already operate in Eastern Europe could be used for this purpose. 
As we have already suggested in note 35, outside experts could also be em- 
ployed to evaluate competing bids on behalf of shareholdershoters. This may 
be particularly important in Eastern Europe, where, in the absence of smoothly 
operating capital markets, shareholders may have no other means of assessing 
noncash bids. Without outside evaluations, incumbent management would en- 
joy a considerable advantage in being able to “sell” their own bids to share- 
holders. Incumbent management would have more difficulty preventing a nom- 
inated team of outside accountants from gathering information about the firm’s 
assets than it would concealing the information from individual shareholders. 
Accountants could also have an important role in ensuring that outside bidders 
have access to information about the firm. And of course there is very little that 
management can do to stop third parties from putting up cash or noncash bids. 
In  section  15.5,  we  discussed  some  simpler  alternatives  to  Bebchuk’s 
scheme for allocating equity. In Eastern Europe, it might be highly desirable 
to dispense with using Bebchuk’s options, given the poor capital markets. Our 
first alternative may be especially attractive: namely, once the bids have been 
assembled, an outside expert (again, a foreign accounting firm?) assesses them 
and estimates the value, v’,  of the best one; shares are then allocated according 
to absolute priority, taking v’  as if it were the true value of the firm; and, finally, 
a vote is taken among shareholders to decide which bid to accept. 
One concern about the adoption of our procedure in Eastern Europe is that 
the scope for making noncash offers might facilitate collusion among manag- 
ers of mutually indebted firms. This is a particular worry in the current context, 
where interenterprise credits have substantially proliferated since 1988. In such 
a context, one could easily imagine the possibility of several firms, with sizable 
mutual debt obligations, becoming simultaneously insolvent. The managers of 
these firms could collude by making (and then voting in) noncash offers that 
maintain the status quo-thereby  precluding potentially more efficient invest- 
ors or management teams from winning. Incumbent managers would thus keep 
their jobs without any monetary transfer being made, in particular to compen- 
sate minority securityholders. (The drawback here relative to a straight liquida- 
tion procedure like Chapter 7 is that, in the latter, managers would have to be 
party  to a successful cash bid  in order to keep their jobs. But, as we have 
argued, Chapter 7 has serious limitations.) The kinds of devices that we put 
forward in section 16.6.1 to reduce the power of majority voters-for  example, 
not allowing doubly interested parties to participate in the vote, or allowing 237  The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform 
noncash offers to be vetoed by a suitably sized minority of shareholders-may 
help eliminate collusion, too. 
A further concern with implementing our procedure in the current environ- 
ment of  Eastern  Europe is that it would burden  state banks  (which  are the 
main creditors of most large enterprises in the East) with responsibilities in the 
reorganized companies, which they could hardly assume given their bureau- 
cratic management structures and methods.  (State banks are often unable to 
perform such operations as taking deposits, giving account balances, transfer- 
ring money, etc., let alone evaluating projects and monitoring enterprises’ man- 
agers.) We have little to say on this score. The commercialization and/or priva- 
tization  of  state banks  would,  of  course,  help,  as would  the  setting up of 
adequate  supervising  institutions,  such  as  banking  commissions.  (These 
changes are urgently required as part of the transition reform package anyway.) 
In addition, state banks could be obliged to sell the bulk of their equity to the 
private sector within a limited time period-say,  five years-in  order to avoid 
the possibility that the implementation of our procedure in the case of newly 
privatized firms with large state-bank creditors would lead merely to renation- 
alization. 
Appendix 
In this appendix, we briefly look at what is happening now in two of the coun- 
tries of  Eastern Europe-Hungary  and Poland. Unfortunately, we think that 
the bankruptcy procedures that these two countries have adopted are vulnera- 
ble to many of the criticisms that we have leveled against structured bargaining 
procedures  like  the  U.S.  Chapter  11 (see  sec.  15.2.2). That is,  bargaining 
among heterogeneous creditors is unlikely to be efficient, the creditors’ repre- 
sentatives may not have the correct incentives, the procedure may be too soft 
on incumbent management, and judges and officials can abuse discretionary 
powers. 
Hungary 
The new Hungarian bankruptcy law (enacted in September  1991) obliges 
the leadership of an insolvent company to design a rehabilitation program for 
restoring solvency. In the case of state-owned enterprises, the leadership may 
consist of the general assembly of employees or the founding organization. In 
the case of private enterprises, it consists of the membership of the partnership 
or the general assembly of shareholders. 
Within  sixty days from the beginning of  the bankruptcy proceedings, the 
debtor must convene a “compromise negotiation” meeting among representa- 
tives of the company’s creditors. These representatives form a board of credi- 
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agreement. Approval by all members of the board who are present is required 
for the rehabilitation plan to be approved and then ratified by the court. In the 
absence of  any  agreement  within  fifteen  days, the court starts a liquidation 
procedure that is similar to the US. Chapter 7. 
Poland 
Whereas the Hungarian procedure provides a unified framework for dealing 
with state-owned and private companies, in Poland there exist several proce- 
dures to deal with insolvent firms. 
The Law of  State Enterprises (enacted in  1990) prescribed  that, if a state- 
owned enterprise incurred a substantial loss that exceeded its reserve fund and, 
at the same time, the main creditor bank refused to extend credit, then the state 
ownedfounding organization (local government, branch ministry, etc.) could 
either liquidate the enterprise or appoint a new compulsory management. This 
new management is given two years to rehabilitate the enterprise and thereby 
avoid its liquidation. Note that such a procedure clearly discriminates against 
claimholders (banks, trade creditors, etc.) who do not control the enterprise’s 
parent agency. Also, the criteria for deciding between liquidation and appoint- 
ing new management are left unspecified. 
A modification of this procedure for insolvent state-owned enterprises has 
been adopted recently by the Polish Parliament, allowing the enterprise itself 
to initiate a process whereby the creditors would decide (only by unanimous 
agreement) whether to restructure/reschedule  the enterprise’s debt or to let the 
enterprise be liquidated. 
In addition to the procedures  outlined above, the new Polish privatization 
law enacted in July 1990 provides for “liquidations” that amount to the state 
leasing the insolvent enterprise’s assets to new companies. 
For insolvent private firms, the Polish authorities have rehabilitated the old 
Commercial Code of 1934. On declaring the firm insolvent, the relevant court 
appoints a trustee who supervises the property and management of the firm 
and also conducts settlement proceedings.  To be enforceable, any settlement 
must be approved both by the court and by a majority of creditors representing 
at least two-thirds of the firm’s debt obligations. 
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COKUllent  Jeremy C. Stein 
I found this to be a very interesting paper. I am not sure that I agree with the 
specific proposal the authors put forward, but I certainly agree with the prem- 
ise-that  one can do better than current Western bankruptcy procedures, par- 
ticularly those associated with Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 in the United States. 
And I thought that the paper was extremely helpful in laying out the key issues 
that one must confront in trying to design a better system. 
What the authors do is put forth some desirable properties of a bankruptcy 
system, measure Chapter  7-  and Chapter  1  1-type  procedures  against these 
properties,  and find them lacking. They then  go on to try to strike a better 
balance. I will organize my comments in a similar way-I  will start with the 
desirable properties. There are basically  two types of  criteria by  which one 
might judge a bankruptcy system: 
1. Allocational eficiency. This is obviously important-you  want the right 
management team to end up running the firm  after all the smoke clears. You 
do not want the firm to be liquidated if it is more valuable as an ongoing con- 
cern. And you also want a minimum of value destruction during the workout 
process. 
2. Distributional properties. This in turn can be divided into two pieces: 
(a) Is absolute priority observed? Many people, including the authors, seem 
to think that it is important to follow absolute priority. Why? First, it may be a 
good idea simply to uphold contracts, in order to remove a source of (idiosyn- 
cratic) risk and thereby make the securities ex ante more attractive. Second, 
deviations from absolute priority are likely to be associated with allocational 
inefficiencies-for  example, once we are in Chapter 11, people may  waste 
resources haggling over the allocation of the spoils. But it is not clear to me 
that observing absolute priority is an unmixed blessing. It can have costs, too, 
to which I will come back. 
(b) Nobody  should be able to buy companies at “fire-sale’’ prices, even if 241  The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform 
they are the best managers. This is particularly important in the East Europe 
context since it is unlikely to be a closed system-one  must worry about the 
possibility that deep-pocket foreigners are the buyers, which is a welfare loss 
to the country and could have adverse political consequences. Although it is 
not really emphasized by  the authors, I would worry about this criterion a lot. 
So we have three things to keep in mind when evaluating a bankruptcy sys- 
tem: efficient allocation of resources, absolute priority, and the possibility for 
fire sales. Essentially, what Aghion, Hart, and Moore do is ask, How do Chap- 
ter 7 and Chapter 11 measure up against these sorts of criteria, and can we find 
anything that does better? However, before we make this comparison, there is 
a critical point to note: a large fraction of distressed firms never go into formal 
bankruptcy-they  restructure out of court. In Gilson, John, and Lang’s (1990) 
sample of U.S. firms, this fraction is about 50 percent. And the percentage of 
firms restructuring outside formal bankruptcy may  be much higher in other 
financial systems-for  example, in the Japanese or German systems, where 
there tends to be more closely held debt. Why is this critical? If out-of-court 
restructuring is pretty efficient, it is important to encourage it, and the inci- 
dence of such restructuring may be very sensitive to the rules of the game in 
the courts. Take a concrete example. Suppose that out-of-court restructuring 
involves deadweight costs of $1.00 and current Chapter 11 procedures entail 
costs of $10.00. Now suppose that we improve in-court procedures so that the 
costs are down to $8.00 but incentives are changed so that twice as many 
people wind up in court. As I will argue in a moment, this is not a totally 
improbable example, and it relates to the issue of absolute priority. 
The basic problem that Aghion, Hart,  and Moore see with Chapter 7 is a bias 
toward liquidation. They recognize that, owing to shallow pockets, information 
costs, etc., the auction mechanism is far from perfect. I agree and would just 
add  my  fire-sale-to-deep-pocket-foreigners concern. The  good  thing  about 
Chapter 7 in their view is that it tends to observe absolute priority. 
In contrast, Chapter 11 may have the (sometimes) good feature of preserving 
the business on an ongoing basis, but there are also serious problems. First, 
there may be an excessive bias in the direction of preservation of the business 
under  current  management-in  a  sense,  not  enough  liquidation. Second, 
Chapter 11 appears to involve enormous costs of time and haggling. Another 
bad thing about Chapter 11 in Aghion, Hart, and Moore’s view is that it is 
typically associated with large deviations from absolute priority. 
Although I share their concern about costs and destruction of  value, I am 
less sure that deviations from absolute priority per se are all bad. It is important 
to recognize that the potential for deviations from absolute priority will affect 
the restructuring behavior of a firm before it lands in court. From this ex ante 
perspective, deviations may  be  a good thing-metaphorically,  a less sharp 
break between junior and senior claimants may help align interests and facili- 
tate “good” behavior at the restructuring phase. For example, recent work by 
Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1992) shows that, when bank lenders are 242  Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore 
better secured, there is a greater likelihood that out-of-court restructuring will 
fail and the firm will wind up in Chapter 11. Essentially, when banks’ priority 
status is well observed in Chapter  11, they do not seem to take any steps to 
avoid Chapter 11. Thus, the possibility of deviations may get banks to the bar- 
gaining table. 
One can interpret Aghion, Hart, and Moore’s proposal as an attempt to have 
the timeliness, reduced haggling, and absolute priority benefits of  Chapter 7 
while  at the same time removing  some of  the bias toward liquidation. On a 
spectrum between the two, it strikes me overall as much closer to Chapter 7- 
basically, it is still an auction of the firm, with the one key difference being the 
noncash offers. (The Bebchuck allocation scheme is just a way of implement- 
ing absolute priority  when there are “hard-to-value’’ noncash bids.) The idea 
of these noncash bids seems to be to overcome the bias toward liquidation- 
even  if  incumbent  managers  do not  have  deep pockets,  Aghion,  Hart,  and 
Moore suggest that they can retain control with a noncash bid if they really are 
the best team for the job. 
So what  do I  think? First, since I am less convinced  about  the merits  of 
absolute priority, I am less drawn to the scheme-again,  I am worrying about 
the ex ante effects of absolute priority on the ability to restructure out of court. 
Second, while I like the idea of a more flexible auction, I am unsure about how 
different it will be in practice. I have little in the way of evidence to go on here, 
but my instinct is that cash bids will have a pronounced edge in many cases, 
which  brings us back to Chapter 7, and brings  me back to my  big concern 
about deep-pocket foreigners. 
Let me attempt to be a bit more precise about this last point. We can ask the 
theoretical question, How does allowing a noncash bid enable us to accomplish 
anything that cannot already be accomplished  with Chapter 7? Presumably, 
Chapter 7 is less than ideal because capital market imperfections make it diffi- 
cult for certain cash-poor bidders to raise all the financing necessary to make 
an all-cash offer. In other words, because of incentive or information problems, 
the bidders cannot get anyone to accept the securities that they are offering in 
exchange for cash. Well, if this is the case, why will the current group of credi- 
tors be any different-why  will they accept such securities instead of an all- 
cash bid? 
Thus, if the shallow-pocket problem that plagues Chapter 7 is due to some 
real economic “blockage” (i.e., information or moral hazard problems), it is 
not clear to  me exactly how Aghion, Hart, and Moore’s proposal removes the 
blockage. So I see the proposal as effectively pretty close to Chapter 7, which 
troubles me a bit, particularly in the current context. 
Is there a better  option? Again, I agree with  the basic premise that there 
ought to be something between Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 that does better. My 
own inclination would be to start working on the other end of  the spectrum- 
to try to improve on the existing Chapter  11-type  framework.  Perhaps one 
might attempt to alter the rules of the road in Chapter 11 so that haggling costs 243  The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform 
and wastage  of  time are reduced. This might be accomplished by changing 
things in  such a way  as to reduce management’s bargaining power, thereby 
forcing matters to a conclusion more rapidly. One concrete suggestion in this 
regard would be to reduce or remove the so-called exclusivity period of  180 
days (in practice, it often winds up being much  longer) when  management 
alone has the right to make restructuring proposals. 
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Discussion Summary 
Oliver Hart and John Moore started the discussion round by responding to the 
comments of Stein. Hart said that the introduction of noncash bids in the pro- 
posed bankruptcy procedure makes more of  a difference than Stein had ac- 
knowledged. Hart noted that noncash bids would be particularly  valuable in 
the likely case that a firm’s original investorskreditors want to continue their 
association with the firm but are unable to raise the funds to make a cash bid. 
Moore criticized Stein’s conclusion that the proposed new procedure is very 
close to the Chapter 7 procedure. Moore emphasized that the new procedure 
adds the step of converting  the bankrupt firm into an all-equity firm  before 
a bid for the firm is selected. He said that converting  all the claimants into 
equityholders gives them a common objective and that allowing them to vote 
for the winning bid streamlines the selection process. 
Jan Winiecki suggested that the proposed bankruptcy scheme could not be 
implemented efficiently during the current period of rapid economic transition. 
He said that a third of all state-owned firms should be forced into bankruptcy, 
and he warned that the East European countries have only a fledgling financial 
sector and very few individuals with financial skills. He said the East European 
governments will have to rely on “short-cut’’ bankruptcy and antitrust proce- 
dures during the transition period. He suggested that more sophisticated bank- 
ruptcy procedures, like the proposed scheme, could only be implemented five 
or ten years from now. 
Andrei Shleifer warned of a shortage of judges interested in or capable of 
working in the area of commercial law. Shleifer also noted that whoever over- 
sees the bankruptcy procedure may be subject to corruption. He suggested that 
management might bribe local administrators to discourage bids that would 244  Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, and John Moore 
compete with a noncash management bid. This would mean that the proposed 
bankruptcy scheme would effectively end up leading to too few liquidations. 
In response to the comments of Winiecki and Shleifer, Moore said that the 
shortage of individuals with financial skills and the possibility  for corruption 
would also present problems for existing procedures like Chapter 7 and Chap- 
ter 11. He said that the proposed new scheme actually had the advantage that 
it minimizes both the amount of discretion that is given to administrators and 
the amount of financial sophistication that administrators are required to have. 
Inderjit Singh questioned whether it is useful to force firms into bankruptcy 
because they cannot repay debts that were originally incurred for nonmarket 
reasons. He suggested that the authors consider the alternative  of canceling 
debts so that the firms do not have to enter bankruptcy proceedings in the first 
place. 
Jeffrey Suchs questioned whether most claimants are currently capable of 
acting as equity interests. He said that state-owned claimants, like banks, may 
act as a “vague morass of  bureaucratic interests” rather than wealth maximiz- 
ers. He noted that an absence of claimants with a real interest in wealth maxim- 
ization  would  increase  the  possibility  that  competitive  bids  would  not  be 
sought out. 
Michael Dooley  suggested that the authors had overemphasized the diffi- 
culty of achieving coordination among the creditors. He noted that, in almost 
all cases, the government will hold most of the claims. Dooley asked the au- 
thors to suggest administrative rules for the state-owned claimants to follow 
when they exercise their voting rights. 
Philippe Aghion responded to some of the questions. He asked Winiecki 
how he proposed to deal with the third of Polish firms that Winiecki said would 
need to go bankrupt. Aghion emphasized that the current Polish bankruptcy 
procedure would lead to extreme bargaining inefficiencies  because the rules 
that determine priority are vague. In response to Shleifer and Sachs, Aghion 
noted  that the existence of  corrupt administrators  and claimants  with  weak 
incentives compromises the efficiency of all bankruptcy procedures, not just 
the new procedure. Aghion  concluded  that the privatization  of  the banking 
sector would make any bankruptcy procedure, including the new procedure, 
more effective. 